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Of Drones and Justice 
A Just War Theory Analysis of the United States’ Drone Campaigns 






Drones are at the forefront of high-tech warfare. New technology always calls 
into question how we ought to make judgments, especially with regards to war. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), typically called “drones”, have revolutionized 
warfare, allowing aerial surveillance and armed attacks to reach farther than ever 
contemplated with manned aircraft. This has not only opened up new strategic and 
tactical frontiers, but also has borne foggy questions about law, diplomacy, and especially 
ethics. As technology grants us new capabilities, it may be tempting to adopt new moral 
rules. It will be shown that the use of drones does not require us to retreat from 
conventional wartime ethics, usually called Just War theory. A primary question raised, 
which this paper seeks to answer, is whether or not the United States’ recent use of drone 
strikes has been ethical in accordance with Just War theory. Under traditional Just War 
principles, drone strikes outside of active combat zones, without knowledge of the 
target’s identity, should be condemned as immoral and unjust. 
Literature Review 
There is a wealth of scholarship on Just War theory. Generally accepted tenets 
include: Enemy soldiers may be killed, while civilians may not; the intent of a war, and 
subsequent military action, is relevant to its moral evaluation; proportionality is a 
significant factor in judging the morality of a military response; and international law has 
deep roots in the Just War tradition, and tends to reflect it. The history of drones is also 
widely documented. Though few sources have taken the trouble to establish a thorough 
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timeline of all drone strikes, details are available on some of the earliest strikes, their 
targets, and their frequency over time leading up to the present. 
In addition, many authors have taken up the challenge of considering the 
problems that drone technologies pose for traditional Just War principles. Many authors 
have been quick to point out how drones force us to adopt new perspective. A frequently 
noted problem that remains largely unanswered in the literature is that of determining 
whether or not drone operators are combatants. On this topic, no consensus appears in the 
literature. Other common concerns include the necessity and proportionality of drone 
tactics. 
Conspicuously absent in the literature on drones and Just War theory is simplest 
combination of the two subjects: has the United States’ use of drones been consistent 
with Just War principles? It should be noted that many have written thoughtful analyses 
on the problems that are presented by drones with respect to Just War theory. Few 
scholars, however, take a definitive stance as to whether or not the U.S. policy of drone 
warfare has been just. Most scholars who have taken up that torch hold that American 
drone warfare is unwise, but the bulk of that literature regards cost-benefit analysis, and 
still avoids questions of justice. 
A Summary of Just War Theory 
Just War theory formalizes the moral justifications for war. It is a lens fixed in the 
Western philosophical tradition.
1
 It primarily seeks to answer two questions of justice
2
: 
Whether or not the decision to go to war is moral, i.e. if the cause is just; and whether or 
not actions in wartime are moral. The first is typically referred to as jus ad bellum, while 
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the second is known as jus in bello. There is a third category – jus post bellum – which 
refers to questions of justice after the conflict has ended. However, most scholarship on 
Just War concerns only the first two, and this essay follows suit. 
Historically, self-defense has been advanced as the only just cause for going to 
war, though some scholars also contend that humanitarian intervention is compatible with 
Just War principles.
3
 At the outset of conflict, this question can often be easy to answer – 
all it typically requires is knowledge of which actor became violent first. However, as 
conflict continues, this question remains pertinent. Continual reflection is necessary to 
determine whether or not it is moral to expand a war beyond its original scope, and 
whether or not its original cause has disintegrated. 
Because Just War theory specifically deals with the violent conflict of war, most 
of jus in bello analysis is with reference to whom one is allowed to kill, and who is off 
limits. The typical distinction is between “combatants”, who may be the targets of 
wartime operations, and “non-combatants”, who are exempt from being targets of such 
attacks.
4
 This is known as the principle of discrimination. Put simply, only those engaged 
in the conflict are legitimate targets. “Combatant” traditionally refers to a soldier, but 
over the twentieth century, as the face of war has changed, that definition has become 
more complicated. The original conceptions of Just War theory, first formulated centuries 
ago, were designed for “total warfare, for conventional wars fought between the armies 
of two states.”
5
 War in the twentieth century has been a radical departure from war 
throughout most of history, though. Since World War II, we have seen the rise of 
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guerrilla warfare, international terrorist cells, nuclear weapons, and paramilitary groups. 
The changing nature of war has required reflection on the principles behind the 
distinctions of Just War theory. As such, contemporary definitions tend to focus more on 
whether or not a target is a military threat, as opposed to whether or not he or she is a 
soldier in uniform, which was the traditional distinction. “Non-combatant” refers to 
someone not engaged in the conflict, or at least not enough to warrant attacking them on 
sight. In contrast to the diminishing certainty in deciding exactly who is a combatant, the 
definition of non-combatant, or civilian, remains much the same as it did a century ago. 
Two other principles drive jus in bello analysis: proportionality and necessity.
6
 
Proportionality is the notion that damage inflicted should be commensurate with the 
military value of the target, including any collateral damage. Targets that pose more 
extreme threats may justify a greater response. If the terrorist attacks on September 11
th
 
had only killed ten people, the American retaliation against Al-Qaeda would have been so 
grossly disproportionate to the damage caused. Proportionality should not be interpreted 
in a strictly quantitative sense. Proportional responses should take into account two 
factors: how much damage was caused, and how that figure informs the future potential 
to deal damage. The first is a retributive factor, while the second is a determination of 
threat. All military responses must take these factors into account before action, and 
disproportionate responses are unethical under Just War. 
Necessity is the idea that the target must present a great enough threat that attack 
is necessary for the security of a nation. If the objectives can be accomplished without 
resorting to violence, then to use violent means would be unethical. The threat must be of 
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such a nature that only military force can adequately meet it. These can mean that other 
forms of dispute resolution, such as diplomacy, have failed, or perhaps were never 
feasible to begin with. If an objective is not necessary for the defeat of the enemy or 
securing one’s nation, that objective is unethical.  
Just War theory grows out of a philosophical tradition that holds individuals as 
having intrinsic moral value. This means every individual is an end in and of herself.
7
 As 
such, people are not obstacles to a greater goal, such as winning a war. People are not 
means to an end. Targets are only legitimate under Just War theory by virtue of who they 
are and what they are doing, not group identifiers such as nationality. For example, 
deliberately targeting German civilians in World War II, who were not component to the 
German war machine, would have been a violation of Just War principles without 
contention.  
Questions of legality, material cost, and political consequence might guide a 
military decision-making process, and their answers may decide whether or not an action 
is permissible; however, these questions have no influence in deciding whether or not an 
action is ethical, and should thus be ignored in such a determination. International law 
regarding warfare is heavily informed by Just War principles, though.
8
 As such, looking 
for adherence to international law can actually be a good place to start in evaluating 
whether something is ethical under Just War theory. If a group is acting in violation of 
international law in war, its activity is likely in conflict with Just War principles, and 
deserves scrutiny. 
A Survey of Drone Warfare 
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Two drone programs are operated by the United States at present. The first is 
operated by the Department of Defense (DoD), and the second by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).
9
 The DoD program operates semi-publicly and complies with the Laws of 
International Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Laws, and the Standard 
Operating Procedures of the DoD.
10
 The CIA program, in contrast, is not considered a 
military program, is not operated as one, and is not governed “by the same international 
protocols on the conduct of war” as the DoD.
11
 The clandestine and largely 
unaccountable nature of the CIA program creates the most problems for Just War. As 
stated earlier, a strong adherence to international law and accepted principles is often the 
headwater for taking ethical action under Just War theory. Because the CIA program is 
far more clandestine and is not necessarily governed by such principles, its activities are 
of graver concern. 
The CIA’s criteria for selecting drone strike targets are kept largely classified.
12
 
However, many scholars have been able to discern useful distinctions used by the CIA. 
There are two types of strikes – “signature strikes” and “personality strikes.”
13
 
Personality strikes are attacks against specific, known individuals. They require a high 
degree of confidence that the target is present. Signature strikes, on the other hand, are 
made against individuals or groups whose identities have not been discerned. Instead, 
they match a “signature”, or behavior that the United States believes links them to 
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“military activity or association.”
14
 What constitutes signature behavior remains unknown 
to the public, as the United States has not yet declassified the documents outlining the 
standards. Signature strikes are the most common. For example, the majority of strikes in 
Pakistan fall into this strike category.
15
 
The modern use of drones has been almost entirely defined by strikes against 
terrorist targets overseas. As such, when plotting a timeline of U.S. drone strikes, an 
appropriate place to begin is the first strike against a terrorist target. One of the earliest 
such recorded strikes was made in Yemen in 2002, against Al Qaeda.
16
 Since that first 
strike, the three theaters of covert drone strike operations by the United States have been 
in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. The following estimates come from the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (BoI), regarding the deaths and injuries from the drone 
campaigns in these three theaters:
17
 
Pakistan (2004 – 2014) 
• Total killed: 2,400-3,888 
• Civilians killed: 416-959 
• Children killed: 168-204 
• Injured: 1,133-1,706 
Yemen (2002 – 2014) 
• Total killed: 371-541 
• Civilians killed: 64-83 
• Children killed: 7 
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• Injured: 81-199 
Somalia (2007 – 2014) 
• Total killed: 6-9 
• Civilians killed: 0-1 
• Children killed: 0 
• Injured: 2-3 
The numbers reported paint one of the few pictures of the scale of these 
operations and their casualties. Children are of interest in these statistics because while it 
can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants after 
their demise, children can safely be assumed to be innocent bystanders. Pakistan is the 
most extreme example, so let’s break it down to show just the kind of scenario the drone 
campaign there creates. Assuming that all of the reported non-civilian deaths are enemy 
militants, what follows shows why these operations are worth scrutinizing under the lens 
of Just War theory.
18
 Under the most generous estimates (maximum militant deaths and 
minimum civilian deaths), the portion of civilian casualties is just under 11%. Under the 
most pessimistic estimates (minimum militant deaths and maximum civilian deaths), the 
portion of civilian casualties rises to 40%. These numbers raise the issue of 
proportionality. Conventional wisdom is that some civilian casualties may be justified in 
war, but only up to a point. A few such casualties may be accidental, but too many 
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constitutes reckless behavior. Such negligent destruction of innocent life is reprehensible, 
and killing civilians calls into question just how proportional a military response is.  
This picture is relevant to the Just War analysis primarily for more reasons. First, 
knowing that there are civilian casualties of these operations, and that such casualties 
potentially make up a disturbingly high proportion of those killed, immediately raises 
ethical questions. Second, not all combatants are created equal, so we must be sure that 
they are worth the loss of innocent life. Some targets have a much higher military value 
than others, and pose greater threats. Not all targets merit the sacrifice of noncombatants. 
In fact, it should go without saying that few do. 
Before properly delving into the problems that drones create for a Just War 
analysis, it is important to first understand the distinct advantages that drones offer. 
Drones are legitimate weapons of war: they are not indiscriminate, nor do they cause 
unnecessary suffering.
19
 They ought not be dismissed outright as unethical weaponry. 
Drones eliminate many of the human costs on for the forces using them, perhaps the 
clearest and most attractive justification for their use. Through the use of drone 
technology, we are able to accrue intelligence and engage military targets without risking 
life or limb to our soldiers. Some scholars also contend that removing pilots from harm’s 
way allows drone operators to more “carefully evaluate a situation without combat fears 
and anxiety.”
20
 Some even argue that recording technology used by drones makes it 
easier to hold operators accountable for their actions than traditional pilots, and better 
gauge the military’s adherence to the laws of war and the principles of Just War.
21
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Problems Drones Create in Just War Theory 
There are two pertinent questions that drone strikes raise under Just War theory: 
(1) Are drone operators combatants? 
(2) Have the United States’ drone strike targets in the War on Terror been ethical? 
The first is raised because technology such as drones has never existed before, and a new 
analysis is necessary. The second is the direct application of the ethical principles that 
have been previously discussed. 
The fact that drone operators are not physically in a theater of war blurs 
traditional distinctions. Drone operators are in civilian population centers, leading civilian 
lives outside of their occupation. Unlike regular soldiers, drone operators retire at the end 
of the day. A drone operator’s duties are not constant like those of a soldier. They are 
more akin to stereotypical employment where you come in to work each day, gathering 
intelligence, and executing strikes when required. 
The situation described closely mirrors the targeted drone strikes by the United 
States to eliminate terror suspects. If you remain a combatant even when you re-enter 
civilian life and cease to be an active threat, then an attack on our drone operators – 
again, leading civilian lives in civilian homes – would be legitimate. On the other hand, if 
we find that you become a civilian when you return to civilian life and cease to be an 
active threat, the American drone strikes against terrorist suspects who are not active 
military threats would be immoral. 
In order to answer question (2), we must first evaluate if the targets of U.S. drone 
strikes are so valuable as to justify the deaths of noncombatants, since we know we are 
inflicting civilian casualties. Had we needed to annihilate a small home of five or ten 
12 
 
innocents to kill Osama bin Laden, it would not have been difficult to justify under Just 
War. The amount of collateral damage needs to incorporate how much of a threat is being 
posed. Given his crimes, and the significant threat he posed, some civilian deaths likely 
would be justifiable, however regrettable. A hundred innocent deaths, though, would be 
far more difficult to justify. A thousand would be even more challenging. Loss of 
innocent life is a timeless fact of war. Harming innocents cannot be an end in itself, but 
may be held permissible as a foreseeable but unintended consequence of an otherwise 
just action.
22
 Civilian casualties can be justified under Just War theory; however, there 
are situations in which the civilian sacrifice is so disproportionate that it is impossible to 
validate. 
Consider a target that is not as great a threat as Osama bin Laden. If our target is a 
low-level Taliban operative, who has killed American soldiers and plots to do so again, 
we ought to establish if he is worth risking civilian lives? What if our target only supplies 
intelligence to Al Qaeda, has never pointed a gun at an American, and never intends to? 
Given that we know the drone operations have resulted in sizable civilian casualties, it is 
of upmost importance that the military value – and identity – of our targets be properly 
evaluated.  
Ethics of American Drone Policy 
In answering question (1), the only reachable conclusion under Just War theory is 
that drone operators ought to be considered combatants. Among the most important 
considerations in evaluating combatant status is the threat that one carries; arguably, this 
consideration is paramount. If an actor were not a threat, justifying his or her death under 
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Just War theory would appear impossible, as such a person would by definition to fall 
into the category of non-combatant. This can be broken down into two parts: What kind 
of threat is posed, and when the threat is posed. The only threat that can merit killing is 
one of physical violence. Other threats, such as those of a psychological nature, might 
merit military action, but in order to justify execution, a threat must be extreme and 
potentially irreparable. Before we engage in killing another human being we must be sure 
that to leave that person alive means leaving other lives in danger. In other words, the 
threat creates the ultimate us-or-them scenario: either we will die, or they will die. Perfect 
certainty is always too much to ask for in war, but to even begin to satisfy Just War 
principles, we must at least be reasonably sure of the threat posed. 
Under Just War theory, drone operators threaten human life. So long as they are at 
the controls, the armed drones under their command pose a direct and deadly threat to 
their enemies. In order to justify killing over other means of neutralization, a threat must 
be active. An active threat is one in which the actor is in the process of endangering lives. 
Drone operators clearly present an active threat to their enemies while at the controls, but 
when they leave to go home, are they an imminent threat that merits elimination? To 
answer this, let’s set up a hypothetical. 
Consider a scenario in which you know someone is about to enlist in an enemy 
military force. You have reasonable certainty that she will soon be a soldier in the enemy 
army. However, she is not yet a soldier. Killing her in order to prevent her from 
becoming a soldier, and therefore a threat, seems immediately unethical. Until she 
becomes a soldier, is trained, armed, and ready to obey orders, there is nothing about her 
that is threatening. The reason for this is that the requirements for killing her haven’t yet 
14 
 
manifested. What justifies taking a life in wartime is the reasonable expectation that the 
target’s presence threatens the lives of others. Until that threat manifests, by definition, 
those lives are not in danger. The us-or-them situation hasn’t yet come to pass, and 
therefore taking another human life cannot be justified.  
When they finish their day, drone operators cease to be active threats, as they no 
longer have the capacity to do harm. The thing that made them an active threat – control 
over a military drone – is stripped away. Without that kind of force available, they 
become identical to civilians in all but their intentions, which are insufficient to justify 
their deaths. In sum, drone operators must be considered combatants while at the controls 
due to the active threat they present to their adversaries, but afterwards, upon returning to 
their civilian lives, their disconnect must be respected and they must be considered non-
combatants during that time. 
This conclusion, however, produces difficulties in answering question (2). 
Especially with the signature strikes of the CIA, the magnitude of the threat presented by 
a drone target is often uncertain. Using the principles that establish an actor as a 
legitimate target (i.e., a combatant), we can craft two scenarios that will further illustrate 
the circumstances under which a killing is just. 
First is a scenario akin to a personality strike, in which the target is known and 
has a history. Suppose this target has previously attacked our country, threatened our 
people, and continues to plot against us. Based upon what we know about the target, we 
can reasonably conclude that his dangerous activities in the past will continue into the 
future, and he is therefore a threat. This can be summed up as the assassin’s justification: 
the target has proven to be dangerous, and based upon past behavior we know with 
15 
 
reasonable certainty that this target will continue to be so. There is a caveat to this, 
however. As was previously stated, killing requires that there be no other feasible option. 
Therefore, it must first be shown that the threat cannot be neutralized by anything short of 
killing. 
The second scenario concerns a target whose identity is not known; we know only 
his context: his current activities, location, etc. Based upon a target’s context, we can 
reasonably infer whether or not he will threaten us in the foreseeable future. Consider a 
soldier in the enemy’s camp, and that we can discern from our knowledge of the enemy 
that their soldiers are deployed to kill us. As such, any one of their soldiers qualifies as a 
threat, even if they are not in that moment firing upon us. Let this be called the warzone 
justification: all enemy soldiers are threats; the target is an enemy soldier; ergo the target 
is a threat. As a result, taking a first strike would be just, knowing that the target’s 
continued existence threatens our wellbeing. The warzone justification is rarely so clean-
cut in modern warfare, of course. Terrorists rarely fly colors or wear uniforms. They 
often dress as civilians and organize themselves in civilian population centers. However, 
even factoring these facts in, there are still criteria that would allow us to reasonably 
discern a target is in fact an enemy combatant. 
The United States’ targeted personality strikes by drones definitely fall within the 
purview of the assassin’s justification. There are arguments for whether or not such 
tactics are prudent, but they seem to qualify as just under the lens of Just War theory. 
Signature strikes, unsurprisingly, are where the problems manifest. It’s conceivable that 
signature strikes could be validated using the warzone justification. However, the 
16 
 
warzone justification only suffices when one has met a certain threshold of contextual 
information. Therefore, it is a question of facts independent of the target.  
There are two reasons that the official justifications for signature strikes sound 
suspect at best. First, the processes by which signatures are established and assigned are 
kept classified. We have absolutely no official insights, therefore, into why the United 
States sees fit to kill these individuals. We only know that they are suspected terrorists. 
So our options are to either trust the government entirely when it claims that it has found 
terrorists, or remain skeptical and demand more evidence.  
Second, many of the strikes occur in civilian centers, often isolated from the 
general population. The majority of strikes in Pakistan, for example, happen in villages in 
North and South Waziristan, rural areas for which outsider access is difficult.
23
 If we had 
more detailed information as to how signature targets are chosen, then attacking bombing 
small villages would be easier to comprehend. Conversely, if the attacks were being 
carried out on more obvious military centers, rather than rural villages, it would be easier 
to believe that the justification was rational. However, missing these crucial data means 
that the most prudent option is skepticism until more information is found. As a result, 
we cannot declare the signature strikes as just. 
This same problem – lack of public information – means that signature strikes 
continue to fail on two more fronts, too: necessity and proportionality. Without public 
information on what constitutes a signature – to use CIA parlance – for militancy, we 
have no way of gauging the nature and magnitude of a threat being posed, and whether or 
not the use of military force is necessary to neutralize that threat. Similarly, without the 
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criteria for such a signature it’s impossible to estimate proportionality; we are missing an 
understanding of the target’s past actions that merit retribution, and we cannot understand 
how those actions indicate a future threat. So ultimately, the signature strikes fail to 
uphold all three jus in bello principles necessary for just warfare. 
But even if the signature strikes met all three jus in bello criteria, there is 
considerable reason to question the legitimacy of the war on terror in the first place. The 
movement to avenge the United States for the September 11
th
 attacks has long since 
evolved into a global war on radical Islamic terrorism. The justification for this war has 
been that of pre-emptive self-defense. Law professor Mary O’Connell asserts that this 
justification runs counter to  international laws of self-defense: “The law of self-defense 
does not permit states to attack before they possess evidence of armed attack occurring – 
evidence of plots does not suffice.”
24
 Even if the self-defense was considered legitimate, 
however, the logic that the United States may kill terrorist threats at will, regardless of 
national boundaries, leads to unsettling conclusions. If we can kill terrorists in Pakistan 
and Yemen, why not in Germany, the United Kingdom, or even the United States itself?
25
 
The calculus of the argument does not change simply because the target is an American 
citizen. Yet to treat citizens the way we have treated terrorists overseas would completely 
contradict due process, which itself is a cornerstone of the liberal democracy we claim to 
defend. 
The United States government has taken such concerns to their logical extreme 
already. In late 2011, Anwar al Awlaki, a Yemeni imam and Islamic militant, and his 17-
year old son Abdulrahman were both killed in separate drone attacks. Both were 
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 In the memo outlining the legal justification for such action, the 
Justice Department claimed that joining the “forces of the enemy” overrode the 
protections offered by domestic law, made that person an enemy of the state, and a 
legitimate military target.
27
 Such a precedent is exceptionally dangerous; allowing a state 
to selectively execute its own citizens unilaterally and without due process of law is 
grossly unethical. Those precedents that lead to such an outcome would be by extension 
unethical, and thus unjust. And if the war itself is not just, then the jus in bello concerns 
are moot. 
Conclusion 
 There is little evidence that the signature strikes carried out by the United States at 
all adhere to the Just War principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality, and 
what evidence we do have should encourage skepticism, not optimism. These concerns 
stand even if the government is given the benefit of the doubt and we assume that the war 
is only jus ad bellum, though there is reason not to give that luxury. The burden of proof 
is on the government of the United States to show that it has not been engaging in unjust, 
unethical warfare. Lacking that information, it is nigh impossible to condone the 
signature strikes as just. The government has failed to meet that burden, and the only 
remaining conclusion is that our campaign of signature strikes in the War on Terror is 
largely, if not wholly, immoral under the theory of Just War. 
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